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  3. I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI.

I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI.

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  • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

    @drwhax I think we need a bit of nuance here.

    As much as I am no fan of LLMs, I can see the value of running them over one's own codebase in order to find vulnerabilities.

    But I remain unconvinced that vibe-coded fixes are a good idea, or ever will be. I think this needs to be clearly said.

    The reason is that these are fundamentally different problems.

    rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
    rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
    rysiek@mstdn.social
    wrote sidst redigeret af
    #7

    @drwhax finding vulnerabilities can be stochastic because it has a very clear and effective verification function: either the exploit works or it does not. Exploit code can be messy and convoluted, as it is not going to be maintained after the vulnerability is fixed.

    Vibe-coding fixes does not have that kind of verification function: the fix must not only close the specific vulnerability, but *also* not introduce new ones or re-introduce old ones, and it has to be maintainable in the future.

    rysiek@mstdn.socialR 1 Reply Last reply
    0
    • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

      @drwhax I think we need a bit of nuance here.

      As much as I am no fan of LLMs, I can see the value of running them over one's own codebase in order to find vulnerabilities.

      But I remain unconvinced that vibe-coded fixes are a good idea, or ever will be. I think this needs to be clearly said.

      The reason is that these are fundamentally different problems.

      drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
      drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
      drwhax@infosec.exchange
      wrote sidst redigeret af
      #8

      @rysiek Human in the loop is important here, vibe-coded patches are most of the time not very good. However, the models do tend to improve, but what really helps in this case in lets say an C/C++ code base, alright parrot, make me an fuzzer that fuzzes these paths and we'll let it run on every commit so we can catch things.

      Last night, well, eherm,... 2am, my parrot was adding a fuzzer to code that hadn't been fuzzed and it showed, bugs came falling out.

      The human needs to stay in the loop with all these things of course, i'm not advocating for a pure AI/LLM/Parrot solution. But oh boy, are they good at pattern recognition.

      rysiek@mstdn.socialR 1 Reply Last reply
      0
      • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

        @drwhax finding vulnerabilities can be stochastic because it has a very clear and effective verification function: either the exploit works or it does not. Exploit code can be messy and convoluted, as it is not going to be maintained after the vulnerability is fixed.

        Vibe-coding fixes does not have that kind of verification function: the fix must not only close the specific vulnerability, but *also* not introduce new ones or re-introduce old ones, and it has to be maintainable in the future.

        rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
        rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
        rysiek@mstdn.social
        wrote sidst redigeret af
        #9

        @drwhax and in the end this will come down to managing limited resources and incentives, as always.

        If a company can spend $1m in tokens on their codebase, are they incentivized to spend it on finding vulnerabilities, or churning out new vibe-coded features? I know what my guess is.

        drwhax@infosec.exchangeD rysiek@mstdn.socialR 2 Replies Last reply
        0
        • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

          @can yes for sure!

          There's a couple things you can do, one of them is indeed as basic as, this is app XYZ, written in PHP, review the codebase for security problems, then adversarially review your findings before writing them down in findings/ per bug in markdown. Also make a root cause and look for variants of the same class of issues across the code base.

          What are some good skills to run is from Trail of Bits which are open-source: https://github.com/trailofbits/skills

          If it's C/C++, LLM's are pretty good at making fuzzers and seeding the dictionary needed to fuzz them effectively.

          If it's open-source you can apply for some openai codex api grant: https://openai.com/form/codex-open-source-fund/

          can@haz.pinkC This user is from outside of this forum
          can@haz.pinkC This user is from outside of this forum
          can@haz.pink
          wrote sidst redigeret af
          #10

          @drwhax thanks!

          1 Reply Last reply
          0
          • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

            @drwhax and in the end this will come down to managing limited resources and incentives, as always.

            If a company can spend $1m in tokens on their codebase, are they incentivized to spend it on finding vulnerabilities, or churning out new vibe-coded features? I know what my guess is.

            drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
            drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
            drwhax@infosec.exchange
            wrote sidst redigeret af
            #11

            @rysiek For sure and the other part is guardrails that currently aren't aligned with the maintainer from these parrots either. Patching is hard or it'll fail because "CYBER"

            1 Reply Last reply
            0
            • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

              @rysiek Human in the loop is important here, vibe-coded patches are most of the time not very good. However, the models do tend to improve, but what really helps in this case in lets say an C/C++ code base, alright parrot, make me an fuzzer that fuzzes these paths and we'll let it run on every commit so we can catch things.

              Last night, well, eherm,... 2am, my parrot was adding a fuzzer to code that hadn't been fuzzed and it showed, bugs came falling out.

              The human needs to stay in the loop with all these things of course, i'm not advocating for a pure AI/LLM/Parrot solution. But oh boy, are they good at pattern recognition.

              rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
              rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
              rysiek@mstdn.social
              wrote sidst redigeret af
              #12

              @drwhax yup. All I am saying is that this distinction is important and needs to be constantly stressed, because people will end up creating more problems by vibe-coding.

              1 Reply Last reply
              0
              • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

                I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI. So here goes!

                I recently got access to trusted access of cyber capabilities of both openai and anthropic, which also allows you to weaponize security vulnerabilities.

                The speed at which these parrots can find bugs and be creative enough to exploit them is staggering.

                I recently pointed an LLM at an kernel fix that was reachable by an unprivileged namespace on Debian and it fully weaponized it, without too much me prompting it in the right direction, in about 7-9 hours.

                I don't think open-source and companies will know what's coming for them once these open-source weight models will have broader reach and get better at exploiting vulnerabilities on a massive scale as anyone can access them.

                The bottom line I think is, you cannot patch faster than the attackers can easily chain all kinds of vulnerabilities together and just move laterally on an incredibly fast pace.

                I've started reporting vulnerabilities to all kinds of projects and the majority have trouble or patching issues found. There's not enough maintainers, or there's simply none anymore.

                I've been getting quite worried about what our future will look like for data privacy. I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure.

                Please run an LLM over your code base if it's internet facing or something critical, we thank you!

                Can't wait for the discussions on this!

                png@yap.pony.bizP This user is from outside of this forum
                png@yap.pony.bizP This user is from outside of this forum
                png@yap.pony.biz
                wrote sidst redigeret af
                #13
                @drwhax The bottleneck seems to be a lack of maintainers, so I don't really see how running LLMs on codebases will fix that. It'll take a maintainer to make the right decision based on LLM output and we're clearly running out of those 😛
                drwhax@infosec.exchangeD 1 Reply Last reply
                0
                • png@yap.pony.bizP png@yap.pony.biz
                  @drwhax The bottleneck seems to be a lack of maintainers, so I don't really see how running LLMs on codebases will fix that. It'll take a maintainer to make the right decision based on LLM output and we're clearly running out of those 😛
                  drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                  drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                  drwhax@infosec.exchange
                  wrote sidst redigeret af
                  #14

                  @png sadly, you're right.

                  infosecdj@infosec.exchangeI 1 Reply Last reply
                  0
                  • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

                    @drwhax and in the end this will come down to managing limited resources and incentives, as always.

                    If a company can spend $1m in tokens on their codebase, are they incentivized to spend it on finding vulnerabilities, or churning out new vibe-coded features? I know what my guess is.

                    rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
                    rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
                    rysiek@mstdn.social
                    wrote sidst redigeret af
                    #15

                    @drwhax and just to drop some data on vibe-coded software quality:
                    https://www.faros.ai/blog/ai-acceleration-whiplash-takeaways

                    The report tries to be very "AI"-positive. But the numbers don't lie: +861% code churn, +242% incidents per PR, +54% bugs per developer.

                    drwhax@infosec.exchangeD 1 Reply Last reply
                    0
                    • buherator@infosec.placeB buherator@infosec.place
                      @drwhax Maybe the advice of the wiser among us will be heard after all these decades: focus on robust mitigations and attack surface reduction, because the moles can't be whacked anymore.
                      ljrk@todon.euL This user is from outside of this forum
                      ljrk@todon.euL This user is from outside of this forum
                      ljrk@todon.eu
                      wrote sidst redigeret af
                      #16

                      @buherator @drwhax I sometimes advise investors (poor life choices I guess) on how to deal with the increased risk of Mythos & others. And this was the bottom line.

                      I don't even need AI specifically to argue for that. The time-to-exploit has been dropping forever. We've built better catalogs and more versatile infrastructure and complex automations. It's very clear that this includes vuln research as well.

                      We had this already with static analysis hitting the field. We answered with "shift left": Building security into the dev process, since the earlier you do it, the less issues you'll end up with. Every step earlier has more downstream impact.

                      We've finally reached the stage where security as part of your design & architecture is not only best practice but becoming a hard requirement. Our automations (including LLMs) pushed us there and we need to deal with the outcome.

                      Or should. Because I'm a cynic and I've seen what's happened, I doubt that engineering will follow through with this. I see two paths and we'll move along both, and I don't like either: Acceptance and few centralized Oligopols.

                      1/2

                      ljrk@todon.euL 1 Reply Last reply
                      0
                      • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

                        @drwhax and just to drop some data on vibe-coded software quality:
                        https://www.faros.ai/blog/ai-acceleration-whiplash-takeaways

                        The report tries to be very "AI"-positive. But the numbers don't lie: +861% code churn, +242% incidents per PR, +54% bugs per developer.

                        drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                        drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                        drwhax@infosec.exchange
                        wrote sidst redigeret af
                        #17

                        @rysiek human in the loop etc 🙂

                        rysiek@mstdn.socialR 1 Reply Last reply
                        0
                        • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

                          I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI. So here goes!

                          I recently got access to trusted access of cyber capabilities of both openai and anthropic, which also allows you to weaponize security vulnerabilities.

                          The speed at which these parrots can find bugs and be creative enough to exploit them is staggering.

                          I recently pointed an LLM at an kernel fix that was reachable by an unprivileged namespace on Debian and it fully weaponized it, without too much me prompting it in the right direction, in about 7-9 hours.

                          I don't think open-source and companies will know what's coming for them once these open-source weight models will have broader reach and get better at exploiting vulnerabilities on a massive scale as anyone can access them.

                          The bottom line I think is, you cannot patch faster than the attackers can easily chain all kinds of vulnerabilities together and just move laterally on an incredibly fast pace.

                          I've started reporting vulnerabilities to all kinds of projects and the majority have trouble or patching issues found. There's not enough maintainers, or there's simply none anymore.

                          I've been getting quite worried about what our future will look like for data privacy. I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure.

                          Please run an LLM over your code base if it's internet facing or something critical, we thank you!

                          Can't wait for the discussions on this!

                          lain@lain.comL This user is from outside of this forum
                          lain@lain.comL This user is from outside of this forum
                          lain@lain.com
                          wrote sidst redigeret af
                          #18
                          @drwhax i have personally helped 3 different fediverse server projects by sharing exploits with them that LLMs found. Most software is full of holes. Running an LLM to hunt for bugs is good advice. If you're not doing it, someone else will.
                          drwhax@infosec.exchangeD 1 Reply Last reply
                          0
                          • lain@lain.comL lain@lain.com
                            @drwhax i have personally helped 3 different fediverse server projects by sharing exploits with them that LLMs found. Most software is full of holes. Running an LLM to hunt for bugs is good advice. If you're not doing it, someone else will.
                            drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                            drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                            drwhax@infosec.exchange
                            wrote sidst redigeret af
                            #19

                            @lain amen

                            1 Reply Last reply
                            0
                            • ljrk@todon.euL ljrk@todon.eu

                              @buherator @drwhax I sometimes advise investors (poor life choices I guess) on how to deal with the increased risk of Mythos & others. And this was the bottom line.

                              I don't even need AI specifically to argue for that. The time-to-exploit has been dropping forever. We've built better catalogs and more versatile infrastructure and complex automations. It's very clear that this includes vuln research as well.

                              We had this already with static analysis hitting the field. We answered with "shift left": Building security into the dev process, since the earlier you do it, the less issues you'll end up with. Every step earlier has more downstream impact.

                              We've finally reached the stage where security as part of your design & architecture is not only best practice but becoming a hard requirement. Our automations (including LLMs) pushed us there and we need to deal with the outcome.

                              Or should. Because I'm a cynic and I've seen what's happened, I doubt that engineering will follow through with this. I see two paths and we'll move along both, and I don't like either: Acceptance and few centralized Oligopols.

                              1/2

                              ljrk@todon.euL This user is from outside of this forum
                              ljrk@todon.euL This user is from outside of this forum
                              ljrk@todon.eu
                              wrote sidst redigeret af
                              #20

                              @buherator @drwhax

                              1. Acceptance. There's the saying "you just need to be more secure than your neighbor". It's not fully true but biz people hold it so. It's flip side is a cynic commentary on security, and a true one at that: If your neighbor is not secure, you don't need to be either. This is still true if you're getting pwned. When everyone's getting hacked regularly, society will accept this new reality. Only the defense sector will still care for security. We've seen similar developments in different industries: Fast fashion isn't an adequate replacement for garment that stands the test of time. But it's getting impossible to buy good clothes, even if you want to. But also with other goods: If everyone produces low quality items, it's financially more reasonable to do the same.

                              2. Centralization. Coz we won't do the right thing and reduce complexity, we need to find a way to make complexity "secure": Cloud, Big5, etc. Corps that have the resources to host an Exchange server securely... or in compliance with regulations. Every tool you do not let a big house host is a liability. Not coz they're necessarily more secure, but because nobody will blame you if something gets wrong. We had that with "buying IBM" once.

                              I hate this outlook but I seriously doubt that we will correct course.

                              tiotasram@kolektiva.socialT buherator@infosec.placeB drwho@masto.hackers.townD 3 Replies Last reply
                              0
                              • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

                                I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI. So here goes!

                                I recently got access to trusted access of cyber capabilities of both openai and anthropic, which also allows you to weaponize security vulnerabilities.

                                The speed at which these parrots can find bugs and be creative enough to exploit them is staggering.

                                I recently pointed an LLM at an kernel fix that was reachable by an unprivileged namespace on Debian and it fully weaponized it, without too much me prompting it in the right direction, in about 7-9 hours.

                                I don't think open-source and companies will know what's coming for them once these open-source weight models will have broader reach and get better at exploiting vulnerabilities on a massive scale as anyone can access them.

                                The bottom line I think is, you cannot patch faster than the attackers can easily chain all kinds of vulnerabilities together and just move laterally on an incredibly fast pace.

                                I've started reporting vulnerabilities to all kinds of projects and the majority have trouble or patching issues found. There's not enough maintainers, or there's simply none anymore.

                                I've been getting quite worried about what our future will look like for data privacy. I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure.

                                Please run an LLM over your code base if it's internet facing or something critical, we thank you!

                                Can't wait for the discussions on this!

                                decapitae@mastodon.socialD This user is from outside of this forum
                                decapitae@mastodon.socialD This user is from outside of this forum
                                decapitae@mastodon.social
                                wrote sidst redigeret af
                                #21

                                @drwhax Using the stones to destroy the stones seems an unavoidable task

                                drwhax@infosec.exchangeD 1 Reply Last reply
                                0
                                • decapitae@mastodon.socialD decapitae@mastodon.social

                                  @drwhax Using the stones to destroy the stones seems an unavoidable task

                                  drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                                  drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                                  drwhax@infosec.exchange
                                  wrote sidst redigeret af
                                  #22

                                  @decapitae Ideally we get more Suhosin's projects for all these different languages, but I doubt it'll happen at this point.

                                  1 Reply Last reply
                                  0
                                  • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

                                    @rysiek human in the loop etc 🙂

                                    rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
                                    rysiek@mstdn.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
                                    rysiek@mstdn.social
                                    wrote sidst redigeret af
                                    #23

                                    @drwhax the problem is this works better for certain tasks (finding vulnerabilities) and much worse for other tasks (vibe-coding) because of the shape of these tasks.

                                    "Human in the loop" is not the get-out-of-LLM-problems-free card people try to pretend it is.

                                    Human in the loop works for vulnerability findings because there is a reliable way of verifying the finding. It clearly does not work well for vibe-coding at all because there is no such reliable way of verifying code correctness.

                                    drwhax@infosec.exchangeD fiar_light@beige.partyF caranea@infosec.exchangeC 3 Replies Last reply
                                    0
                                    • rysiek@mstdn.socialR rysiek@mstdn.social

                                      @drwhax the problem is this works better for certain tasks (finding vulnerabilities) and much worse for other tasks (vibe-coding) because of the shape of these tasks.

                                      "Human in the loop" is not the get-out-of-LLM-problems-free card people try to pretend it is.

                                      Human in the loop works for vulnerability findings because there is a reliable way of verifying the finding. It clearly does not work well for vibe-coding at all because there is no such reliable way of verifying code correctness.

                                      drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                                      drwhax@infosec.exchangeD This user is from outside of this forum
                                      drwhax@infosec.exchange
                                      wrote sidst redigeret af
                                      #24

                                      @rysiek I think we'll get there in a number of years, the way the field is developing now we got all these super fast interconnects and HBM memory and not to mention advancements in the machine learning field.

                                      I almost puke writing this lol

                                      rysiek@mstdn.socialR 1 Reply Last reply
                                      0
                                      • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

                                        I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI. So here goes!

                                        I recently got access to trusted access of cyber capabilities of both openai and anthropic, which also allows you to weaponize security vulnerabilities.

                                        The speed at which these parrots can find bugs and be creative enough to exploit them is staggering.

                                        I recently pointed an LLM at an kernel fix that was reachable by an unprivileged namespace on Debian and it fully weaponized it, without too much me prompting it in the right direction, in about 7-9 hours.

                                        I don't think open-source and companies will know what's coming for them once these open-source weight models will have broader reach and get better at exploiting vulnerabilities on a massive scale as anyone can access them.

                                        The bottom line I think is, you cannot patch faster than the attackers can easily chain all kinds of vulnerabilities together and just move laterally on an incredibly fast pace.

                                        I've started reporting vulnerabilities to all kinds of projects and the majority have trouble or patching issues found. There's not enough maintainers, or there's simply none anymore.

                                        I've been getting quite worried about what our future will look like for data privacy. I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure.

                                        Please run an LLM over your code base if it's internet facing or something critical, we thank you!

                                        Can't wait for the discussions on this!

                                        hughsie@mastodon.socialH This user is from outside of this forum
                                        hughsie@mastodon.socialH This user is from outside of this forum
                                        hughsie@mastodon.social
                                        wrote sidst redigeret af
                                        #25

                                        @drwhax a lot of us at Red Hat have been working at 100% for the last 6 months on basically this. I personally spend ~2h/day on AISLE and Mythos reports and getting fixes upstream.

                                        drwhax@infosec.exchangeD 1 Reply Last reply
                                        0
                                        • drwhax@infosec.exchangeD drwhax@infosec.exchange

                                          @can yes for sure!

                                          There's a couple things you can do, one of them is indeed as basic as, this is app XYZ, written in PHP, review the codebase for security problems, then adversarially review your findings before writing them down in findings/ per bug in markdown. Also make a root cause and look for variants of the same class of issues across the code base.

                                          What are some good skills to run is from Trail of Bits which are open-source: https://github.com/trailofbits/skills

                                          If it's C/C++, LLM's are pretty good at making fuzzers and seeding the dictionary needed to fuzz them effectively.

                                          If it's open-source you can apply for some openai codex api grant: https://openai.com/form/codex-open-source-fund/

                                          offbeatmammal@mastodon.socialO This user is from outside of this forum
                                          offbeatmammal@mastodon.socialO This user is from outside of this forum
                                          offbeatmammal@mastodon.social
                                          wrote sidst redigeret af
                                          #26

                                          @drwhax @can great pointer, thanks. Going to try this tomorrow on a couple of our codebases (one 100% human coded, one originally human but with progressive LMM development over the last couple of months) - might be adjusting some development schedules depending on what I find!

                                          drwhax@infosec.exchangeD 1 Reply Last reply
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