Let me get this straight...

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@Mer__edith
Can we get a comment on this?

1) The default Signal setting to show message contents in push notifications seems... bad, assuming this article is accurate.
2) Does changing the in-Signal-app setting for Notification Content indeed prevent notifications from being stored anywhere, which by default contains incoming message bodies.

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@omnicore @signalapp
Regardless, even just testing things out on a clean test device, an iPhone with Lockdown Mode enabled still gets push notifications with the incoming message body.

So, color me skeptical that Lockdown Mode does anything regarding this.

[avuko@infosec.exchange]

@Beachbum @wdormann if you do not want to be tracked/traced/placed, don’t bring a mobile phone in any way tied to you or your previous locations.

I worked in telco for years, trust me on this one.

The problem here was different: people who thought they were communicating privately, had their messages (or those that ended up in Apple’s notifications database on the iPhone) accessible to law enforcement. Even after (taking precautions like) deleting the app.

[awkwardturing@infosec.exchange]

@wdormann what does that mean for any other app that pushes sensitive data as notifications? Wondering if disabling the notification rly disables the storing in the DB or just the display of it.

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@AwkwardTuring
Right. That's the million dollar question.

[grammasaurus@mastodon.social]

@omnicore @wdormann @signalapp What I got from the article is what you said here: the weakness is in iPhone’s default behavior.

[cppguy@infosec.space]

@avuko @wdormann

Oh, but it's even worse than that. From TFA:

Authorities have turned to push notifications more broadly as an investigative strategy too; in June 404 Media reported Apple gave governments data on thousands of push notifications. Those were legal demands made to Apple, while the Prairieland case was about data from a device authorities had physical access to.

This suggests that your #notifications are sent home to #Apple. Why is that necessary?

I have further questions:

• Why, and for whose benefit, were notifications stored on the phone after the #Signal app had been removed? They were useless to the other of the phone.
• How much of this vulnerability is shared with Android phones?

[tdpsk@sueden.social]

@wdormann @Mer__edith I was unaware notifications on iOS were stored in an on-device database even after they had been dismissed. That seems like an inefficient waste of storage - does anybody have a link to some Apple docs providing context about this database?

[beachbum@mastodon.sdf.org]

@avuko @wdormann That’s partly why I’m asking because I disable notifications as soon as I purchase a phone. Locating my phone is important because I misplace it a lot. My location services it’s also always off.
I have a degree in IT, but it goes back to 2006 and so much has changed since then and honestly, I only keep up through what I read here on Mastodon. I thought doing these things would secure my privacy.

[beachbum@mastodon.sdf.org]

@avuko @wdormann I was rather shocked that this could even be possible yet actually occurring.

[prism@infosec.exchange]

@wdormann The default setting is that you get notified when you receive a message, because most people want those.

[craignicol@glasgow.social]

@wdormann @mastodonmigration eh what?

On Android it just shows "you have a new message". Was this an Apple or a Signal decision?

[lennybacon@infosec.exchange]

@wdormann Looks different here. But it’s Most probably the „Preview“ -Thing that causes Information to leak (to the OS which persists it unsecure)

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@lennybacon
The screenshot I shared is from the Signal app itself, in Settings.

Not iPhone-wide settings.

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@prism
The default setting is that you get notified with the message contents

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@tdpsk @Mer__edith
The problem is that such content is not included in unencrypted backups. So we mortals can't even confirm this, as we don't have access to full-device exploit tools such as Cellebrite.

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@grammasaurus @omnicore @signalapp

The screenshot I shared is from the Signal app itself, which chooses to include the message content in notifications.

So I'd say that both are at fault.

[thomasareed@infosec.exchange]

@wdormann @Viss It’s been a while since I installed Signal, but I have a vague memory that it may have reminded me to change that setting the first time I ran it.

[wdormann@infosec.exchange]

@CppGuy @avuko

Apple gave governments data on thousands of push notifications

Is open to wide interpretation. Did they give information about thousands of push notifications? (i.e. metadata) (e.g. the App that sent the notification and the timestamp, and potentially account info tied to the request)

If they gave the actual notification content, then that's a whole other scandalous animal. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and whatnot.

[lazarus7@infosec.exchange]

@wdormann switching my friends and family to signal was made easier because of settings like this. It behaves like a normal messaging app. None of them have a threat model that has them thinking of device seizure by law enforcement.